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- /*
- * Copyright 2002-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
- #include <string.h>
- #include "ec_local.h"
- #include "internal/refcount.h"
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/engine.h>
- #include "crypto/bn.h"
- EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
- {
- return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL);
- }
- EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
- {
- EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
- ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ret->group == NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
- && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
- }
- void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
- {
- int i;
- if (r == NULL)
- return;
- CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
- REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
- if (i > 0)
- return;
- REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
- if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
- r->meth->finish(r);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
- #endif
- if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
- r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
- EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
- EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
- BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
- OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
- }
- EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
- {
- if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return NULL;
- }
- if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
- if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
- dest->meth->finish(dest);
- if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
- dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
- return 0;
- dest->engine = NULL;
- #endif
- }
- /* copy the parameters */
- if (src->group != NULL) {
- const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
- /* clear the old group */
- EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
- dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
- if (dest->group == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
- return NULL;
- /* copy the public key */
- if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
- EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
- dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
- if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
- return NULL;
- }
- /* copy the private key */
- if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
- if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
- dest->priv_key = BN_new();
- if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
- return NULL;
- }
- if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
- return NULL;
- if (src->group->meth->keycopy
- && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
- return NULL;
- }
- }
- /* copy the rest */
- dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
- dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
- dest->version = src->version;
- dest->flags = src->flags;
- if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
- &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
- return NULL;
- if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
- return NULL;
- dest->engine = src->engine;
- #endif
- dest->meth = src->meth;
- }
- if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
- return NULL;
- return dest;
- }
- EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
- {
- EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_method(ec_key->engine);
- if (ret == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ret;
- }
- int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
- {
- int i;
- if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
- return 0;
- REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
- REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
- return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
- }
- ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- return eckey->engine;
- }
- int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL)
- return eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- return 0;
- }
- int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
- }
- int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
- EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
- priv_key = BN_new();
- if (priv_key == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else
- priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
- order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
- if (order == NULL)
- goto err;
- do
- if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, order))
- goto err;
- while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
- if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
- if (pub_key == NULL)
- goto err;
- } else
- pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
- goto err;
- eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
- eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
- if (eckey->priv_key != priv_key)
- BN_free(priv_key);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return ok;
- }
- int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
- NULL, NULL);
- }
- int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
- }
- return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
- }
- int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
- if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
- order = eckey->group->order;
- if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
- * pub_key
- */
- if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
- if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
- NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ok = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return ok;
- }
- int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
- BIGNUM *y)
- {
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
- EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- int ok = 0;
- if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
- ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return 0;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
- if (point == NULL)
- goto err;
- tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (ty == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- /*
- * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field
- * order: if not values are out of range.
- */
- if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)
- || (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0)
- || (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
- EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
- goto err;
- if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0)
- goto err;
- ok = 1;
- err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return ok;
- }
- const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- return key->group;
- }
- int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
- {
- if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
- return 0;
- EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
- key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
- return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
- }
- const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- return key->priv_key;
- }
- int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
- {
- int fixed_top;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
- BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
- if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
- return 0;
- /*
- * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
- * fully initialized state.
- *
- * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
- * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
- * as an EC private key.
- */
- order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
- if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
- return 0; /* This should never happen */
- if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
- && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
- return 0;
- if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
- && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
- return 0;
- /*
- * Return `0` to comply with legacy behavior for this function, see
- * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18744#issuecomment-1195175696
- */
- if (priv_key == NULL) {
- BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
- key->priv_key = NULL;
- return 0; /* intentional for legacy compatibility */
- }
- /*
- * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
- * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
- * holding the secret scalar.
- *
- * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
- * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
- * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
- * the caller specifically set it.
- *
- * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
- * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
- * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
- *
- * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
- * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
- * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
- * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
- *
- * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
- * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
- * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
- * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
- * accesses.
- *
- * Fixed Length
- * ------------
- *
- * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
- * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
- * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
- * secret scalars.
- *
- * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
- * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
- * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
- * might temporarily overflow the order length.
- */
- tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
- if (tmp_key == NULL)
- return 0;
- BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
- if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
- BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
- return 0;
- }
- BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
- key->priv_key = tmp_key;
- return 1;
- }
- const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- return key->pub_key;
- }
- int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
- {
- if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
- && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
- return 0;
- EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
- key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
- return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
- }
- unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- return key->enc_flag;
- }
- void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags)
- {
- key->enc_flag = flags;
- }
- point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- return key->conv_form;
- }
- void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
- {
- key->conv_form = cform;
- if (key->group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
- }
- void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
- {
- if (key->group != NULL)
- EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
- }
- int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (key->group == NULL)
- return 0;
- return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
- }
- int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- return key->flags;
- }
- void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
- {
- key->flags |= flags;
- }
- void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
- {
- key->flags &= ~flags;
- }
- int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key)
- {
- if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
- return -1;
- return key->group->decoded_from_explicit_params;
- }
- size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
- unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
- return 0;
- return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
- }
- int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (key->pub_key == NULL)
- key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
- if (key->pub_key == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
- return 0;
- /*
- * Save the point conversion form.
- * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
- * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
- * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
- * the buffer so we know it is valid.
- */
- if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
- key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
- return 1;
- }
- size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
- {
- if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
- }
- return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
- }
- size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
- unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
- {
- size_t buf_len;
- buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
- if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (buf == NULL)
- return buf_len;
- else if (len < buf_len)
- return 0;
- /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
- if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
- return buf_len;
- }
- int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
- {
- if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
- return 0;
- }
- return eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
- }
- int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
- {
- if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
- eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
- if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
- {
- size_t len;
- unsigned char *buf;
- len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
- if (len == 0)
- return 0;
- if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
- if (len == 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return 0;
- }
- *pbuf = buf;
- return len;
- }
- int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
- if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
- || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
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